Bhagavad Gītā Chapter 4, Verse 40: Krishna to Arjuna — Jñāna-Karma-Sannyāsa-Yoga

Bhāṣyakāra purports

• Śaṅkaraadvaita

  The one without ātma-jñāna (self-knowledge) and without śraddhā (faith) in the words of guru and śāstra is already diminished; but the saṃśayātmā (one whose very self is doubt) is the most ruined of all, for he is the most sinful (pāpiṣṭha). For him neither this ordinary world exists — he cannot accomplish even worldly aims — nor does the higher world, nor any sukha (happiness), because doubt arises even there. Therefore saṃśaya must not be entertained: it is the root destruction.

  divergence: Śaṅkara: 'saṃśayātmā tu pāpiṣṭhaḥ sarveṣām' — the doubting-selfed person is the most sinful among all three; ajña and aśraddadhāna perish but not as utterly as the saṃśayātmā.

• Rāmānujaviśiṣṭādvaita

  The ajña lacks the jñāna obtained through upadeśa (instruction); the aśraddadhāna does not hasten toward the means of growing that knowledge; the saṃśayātmā doubts the very knowledge that was given. For such a one even this prākṛta-loka (natural world) does not exist, and the dharma-artha-kāma puruṣārthas (the four human goals) cannot be accomplished — how much less mokṣa? Because all śāstrīya-karma-siddhi (accomplishment through scriptural action) rests on the prior certainty of the ātman as distinct from the body, the doubter cannot taste even a fraction of sukha.

  divergence: Rāmānuja: 'ātmayāthātmyaviṣaye jñāne saṃśayātmanaḥ ayam api prākṛta-loko na asti' — the doubt is specifically about the true nature of the ātman; without that resolution, no puruṣārtha is accessible.

• Madhvadvaita

  *Ajñaḥ* (one without *jñāna*, knowledge of *tattva*), *aśraddadhānaḥ* (one without *śraddhā*, the faith that *Hari* is the sole *svatantra*, the independently real), and *saṃśayātmā* (the one whose self is split by doubt) — these three *vinaśyati*, perish. *Nāyaṃ lokaḥ* (not this world), *na paraḥ* (not the higher world), *na sukham* (not even transient happiness) belongs to the *saṃśayātmā*. In the Dvaita reading, *saṃśaya* is not mere intellectual hesitation but the refusal to settle the *pañca-bheda* (the five-fold real distinction: Lord–*jīva*, Lord–matter, *jīva*–*jīva*, *jīva*–matter, matter–matter) as real and eternal. The *ajñaḥ* has not attained *svarūpa-jñāna*, the direct cognition of Hari's own nature as *niratiśaya-sat* (unsurpassably real). The *aśraddadhānaḥ* lacks the stable *bhakti*-orientation that follows from that cognition. The *saṃśayātmā*, worst of the three, doubts whether the *jīva*'s *paratantra* (eternally dependent) relation to Hari is genuine — and so cannot surrender, cannot worship, and forfeits every domain of happiness. Because *bheda* is real and the *jīva*'s dependence is a fact of *svarūpa*, not a convention, this doubt does not merely confuse the mind; it severs the *jīva* from the very *taratamya* (graded ontological hierarchy) by which liberation through *bhakti* is secured. No *loka* — present or future — admits the one who will not know Hari as he is.

  divergence: No Madhva or Jayatīrtha bhāṣya survives for 4.40. Reading voiced directly from Dvaita *siddhānta* primitives applied to the mūla.

• Vallabhaśuddhādvaita

  Having already identified the aśraddadhāna (the faithless one) as unfit, Vallabha now names a third class of the ineligible: the ajña who does not know what was taught, the one who has knowledge but lacks śraddhā, and supremely the saṃśayī whose doubt is the greatest disqualification of all. For such a one nothing holds: neither this-world wealth and marriage, nor the other-world, nor sukha even in enjoyment. The conclusion Vallabha draws is immediate and practical: only the niścayātmikā buddhi (resolute, certain intellect) is fitting for Puṣṭi-mārga — prasāda cannot flow into a vessel split by doubt.

  divergence: Vallabha: 'niścayātmikaivabuddhirucitā iti bhāvaḥ' — the resolute intellect alone is suitable; doubt makes one the greatest andhikārī (ineligible).

• Śrīdharabhakti

  After praising the jñānādhikārī (one qualified for knowledge), Śrīdhara sets out the three grades of the unqualified: the ajña who does not know what the guru has taught, the aśraddadhāna who has knowledge but doubts whether it will work for him personally, and the saṃśayākrānta-citta (the doubt-overwhelmed mind) who is farthest fallen. The saṃśayātmā perishes in all three registers: this world (artha, vivāha, etc. do not mature), the other world (dharma does not complete), and sukha (even enjoyment is impossible when every object of pleasure is shadowed by doubt). Śrīdhara grades the three clearly: the saṃśayātmā suffers the complete triple loss.

  divergence: Śrīdhara: 'etteṣu triṣv api saṃśayātmā sarvathā naśyati' — of the three types, the saṃśayātmā perishes in every sense.

• Madhusūdanaadvaita-bhakti

  Madhusūdana carefully distinguishes the three: ajña is empty of ātma-jñāna for want of śāstra-study; aśraddadhāna holds a viparyaya-rūpā āstikyā-buddhi (an inverted conviction, a form of nāstika intellect) toward Vedānta-vākya; saṃśayātmā is doubt-invaded everywhere. The ca-kāras (conjunctive particles) in the verse are read by Madhusūdana as explicitly marking that ajña and aśraddadhāna are lesser evils than saṃśayātmā, who is sarvataḥ pāpīyān (most sinful in all directions), deprived of manuṣya-loka welfare, svarga-mokṣa, and even bodily sukha such as eating — because doubt contaminates every moment of experience.

  divergence: Madhusūdana: 'ca-kārābhyāṃ tayoḥ prayogaḥ saṃśayātmā hi sarvataḥ pāpīyān' — the grammatical particles are the proof-text for grading; the doubter is worst in all three registers.