Bhagavad Gītā Chapter 2, Verse 40: Krishna to Arjuna — Sāṅkhya-Yoga

Bhāṣyakāra purports

• Śaṅkaraadvaita

  In the mokṣa-mārga (path of liberation), the karma-yoga that Kṛṣṇa now commends is unlike agriculture and other worldly endeavors where an interrupted beginning (abhikrama, undertaking) is simply wasted — here, no abhikrama-nāśa (loss of the undertaking) occurs, because the purification accomplished so far is not undone by incompletion. Nor does any pratyavāya (counter-demerit arising from partial performance, as from ritual defect) arise — for this yoga is directed toward Īśvara and therefore does not admit the vaiśeṣika defects of contractual ritual. Even the smallest portion of this yoga-dharma (the discipline of desireless action) protects the practitioner from mahato bhaya (great fear), here glossed as the saṃsāra-bhaya (the fear intrinsic to conditioned existence) characterized by janma-maraṇa-ādi (birth, death, and the train of suffering that attends them).

  divergence: Śaṅkara explicitly contrasts karma-yoga with kṛṣi-ādi (agriculture and other sakāma worldly activities) to establish that the verse's two guarantees — no loss, no counter-demerit — belong specifically to niṣkāma-karma-yoga and not to ritual action in general. The anchor concept is the verse's role as a praise (stuti) of yoga-mārga that explains why Arjuna should hear the coming teaching.

• Rāmānujaviśiṣṭādvaita

  In karma-yoga understood as kainkarya (service oriented toward Bhagavān), even an ārambha (beginning) that is interrupted — vicchinno 'pi (even if severed mid-course) before completion — incurs no niṣphalatva (fruitlessness), because the fruit of karma-yoga is śuddhi (purification of the antaḥkaraṇa), and any measure of purification accomplished cannot be reversed. The assurance that even svalpāṃśa (a small portion) of this sva-dharma (one's own dharma) protects from saṃsāra-bhaya (fear of conditioned existence) will be fully expounded at Gītā 6.40 — naiva iha nāmutra vināśas tasya vidyate ("no destruction of him exists either here or hereafter") — meaning Kṛṣṇa is anticipating here what he will confirm later. Worldly and Vedic sādhanas (means), by contrast, when interrupted, neither bear fruit nor spare the practitioner pratyavāya (counter-demerit): their contractual character means partial performance incurs guilt.

  divergence: Rāmānuja uniquely cross-references Gītā 6.40 within the bhāṣya as a prospective confirmation of 2.40's guarantees — the verse is not a standalone assurance but an announcement of a theme Kṛṣṇa will return to after establishing the full architecture of karma-yoga as bhakti-preparation.

• Madhvadvaita

  *Nehābhikrama-nāśo 'sti pratyavāyo na vidyate* — no loss of effort arises here, no adverse return accrues. *Svalpam apy asya dharmasya trāyate mahato bhayāt* — even a small measure of this *dharma* (the path of *bhakti*-infused action toward Hari) delivers one from great fear. The two guarantees rest on *pañca-bheda* (the five-fold real distinction) and the absolute *svatantra* (independently real, self-sufficient) nature of Hari. Because the *jīva* (the individual self) is *paratantra* (eternally dependent) and Hari is omniscient, every genuine step taken toward him is received, retained, and accounted within his *anugraha* (grace) — it cannot evaporate as a mundane act might. The *abhikrama* (initial effort) is not a mere karmic deposit liable to destruction; it is an act directed at *svatantra* Hari, who holds it. *Pratyavāya* (adverse karmic return), the danger that interrupts ordinary rites, has no purchase here: what is offered to an all-knowing Lord cannot recoil against the offerer. The *svalpam api* (even a little) clause is decisive within *taratamya* (graded ontological hierarchy): Hari's *anugraha* is disproportionately responsive because the disproportion is Hari's own sovereign nature, not a property of the act. The *mahato bhayāt* (from great fear) from which one is delivered is *saṃsāra*-bondage, the supreme danger for a *paratantra jīva* whose only secure refuge is Hari's *bhakti*-path.

  divergence: No Madhva or Jayatīrtha bhāṣya exists for this verse; the reading derives directly from dvaita *siddhānta* applied to the mūla. The central dvaita move is to ground the verse's twin guarantees — no loss of effort, no adverse return — in Hari's *svatantra* omniscience and his disproportionate *anugraha*, rather than treating them as abstract properties of *karma-yoga*.

• Vallabhaśuddhādvaita

  *Sugamatā* (ease of entry) into yoga for all — that is what *nehābhikrama-nāśo 'sti* declares. *Iha yoga-buddhau dharmasya yo 'bhikramaḥ prārambhas tasya nāśo nāsti* — within yoga-buddhi, whatever *abhikrama* (first step, beginning) one makes into dharma, that beginning is not destroyed. The Bhāgavata confirms: *na hy aṅgopakrame dhvaṃso sva-dharmasya uddhavāṇv api | mayā vyavasitaḥ* (11.29.20) — not even the smallest beginning of one's own dharma is destroyed, thus have I ordained. Hence *svalpam apy asya dharmasya abhikramo mahato bhayāt trāyate* — even the slightest *abhikrama* into this dharma rescues from great fear. In *Sāṅkhya*, once the end is attained, *siddhe dharma-karmaṇāṃ tyāgaḥ* — dharma and karma are relinquished; here it is not so (*atra tu na tathā*). As is said: *yama-ādayas tu kartavyāḥ siddhe yoge kṛtārthatā* — the disciplines are to be performed throughout; fulfillment comes only when yoga is perfected. Kṛṣṇa's own *prasāda* preserves even the tiniest offering on the *puṣṭi-mārga*, and no step taken toward Him is undone.

  divergence: Vallabha alone anchors the verse's guarantee in an explicit Bhāgavata citation — *na hy aṅgopakrame dhvaṃso* (BhP 11.29.20) — rather than resting on the Gītā's internal logic. The contrast with Sāṅkhya (*siddhe dharma-karmaṇāṃ tyāgaḥ* vs. *atra tu na tathā*) is Vallabha's own doctrinal move: the *puṣṭi-mārga* keeps the disciplines active throughout, sustained by Kṛṣṇa's grace, whereas Sāṅkhya dissolves them upon attainment.

• Śrīdharabhakti

  Śrīdhara frames the verse as a direct answer to a purvapakṣa (prior objection): karma-yoga might seem unreliable, like agriculture, where vighnabāhulya (accumulated obstacles) can prevent the harvest and mantra-aṅga-vaiguṇya (deficiency in a ritual limb or auxiliary) can generate pratyavāya (counter-demerit) — so how can karma-yoga reliably dissolve karma-bandha (the bondage of action)? The answer is that because niṣkāma-karma-yoga is performed Īśvara-uddeśena (with the Lord as its sole aim), neither vighna (obstacle) nor aṅga-vaiguṇya (ritual deficiency) can arise — the entire structure of contractual contingency is removed by the orientation of intent. Even the upakrama-mātra (the mere beginning, the bare undertaking) of this dharma, if performed, protects from mahato bhaya (great fear, i.e., saṃsāra): unlike kāmya-karma (desire-driven ritual action), where some defect in even a single aṅga (limb) can nullify the whole, this yoga's partial performance still protects.

  divergence: Śrīdhara is the only commentator who stages the verse explicitly as a purvapakṣa-uttara (objection-and-reply) sequence, treating the agricultural analogy as a genuine challenge rather than merely a contrast. His resolution — that Īśvara-uddeśenā (Lord-directedness) eliminates the very conditions under which pratyavāya arises — is the sharpest formal argument in the panel.

• Madhusūdanaadvaita-bhakti

  Madhusūdana's extraordinarily detailed bhāṣya on 2.40 builds on the pūrvapakṣa from 2.39: since Vedic statements like tad yathā iha karma-jito lokaḥ kṣīyata evam evāmutra puṇya-jito lokaḥ kṣīyate ("just as a world won by earthly action perishes, so too does a world won by merit perish") establish that even accumulated puṇya-phala (meritorious fruit) is subject to kṣaya (decay), how can karma-yoga reliably produce liberation? His answer is that abhikrama-nāśa (loss of progress) does not occur in niṣkāma-karma-yoga because its phala (fruit) is śuddhi (purification of the antaḥkaraṇa), which is loka-śabdāvācya-bhogyatva-abhāva (not a consumable experiential world and therefore not subject to the exhaustion logic of puṇya-loka). The śuddhi-rūpa-phala (fruit in the form of purification) is not a finite heavenly enjoyment that depletes — it is a structural change in the instrument of cognition that persists and accumulates. Similarly, pratyavāya (counter-demerit from incomplete performance) does not arise because niṣkāma-karma-yoga operates in the mode of nityānām upātta-durita-kṣaya (the nityakarmas as vehicles for destroying accumulated sin through Bhagavat-ārādhana), where the full saṃhāra-niyama (requirement to complete all auxiliary rites) does not apply — even partial performance with bhagavad-arpaṇa (dedication to Bhagavān) achieves its purificatory end.

  divergence: Madhusūdana is unique in grounding the verse's guarantees in a detailed epistemology of the śuddhi-phala: the reason karma-yoga's progress cannot be lost is not merely structural (unlike agriculture) but logical — the fruit is not a perishable world-experience but an irreversible refinement of the cognitive instrument. This makes 2.40 an argument about what kind of fruit niṣkāma-karma-yoga produces, not merely an assurance about the path's reliability.