Bhagavad Gītā Chapter 18, Verse 17: Krishna to Arjuna — Mokṣa-Sannyāsa-Yoga
One whose inner sense carries no trace of "I acted," and whose mind does not cling to results, does not kill even while slaying all these worlds, and is not bound.
Bhāṣyakāra purports
- Śaṅkaraadvaita
He whose inner disposition (bhava) is not shaped by the notion 'I am the agent' (ahankrta) — because scripture, teacher, and reasoning have revealed him to be the immutable witness (sakshi), untouched by the operations of body and mind — and whose intellect (buddhi) therefore does not adhere to action by way of 'I did this, I will reap its fruit': even when he strikes down all these beings, he does not in truth perform any act of killing, nor is he bound by its result. The apparent contradiction 'kills yet does not kill' dissolves once both standpoints are held: from the conventional (laukika) standpoint, bodies fall; from the ultimate (paramarthika) standpoint, the atman is unchanging (avikriya) and never an agent. This verse is the summation of the entire Gita-shastra: knowledge-vision (jnana-drsti) dissolves all karma at its root.
divergence: Shankara: 'yasya sastracarya-upadesa-nyaya-samskrtatmanah na bhavati ahankrtah... pasyati... na hanti... na nibadhydate' — the five causes (adhisthana etc.) are superimposed on the atman by avidya; the atman itself is the pure witness.
- Rāmānujaviśiṣṭādvaita
He who meditates continuously on Paramatman as the true agent (paramapu-rusa-kartrtva-anusandhana) — so that the notion 'I act' does not arise as his own — and whose intellect does not cling to the fruit thinking 'this karma belongs to me': such a one, even slaying these worlds in battle, does not truly slay Bhishma and the others, and is not bound by the karma of battle. The key is anusandhana (sustained contemplation of the Lord's agency), which is itself the work of sattvaguna; Ramanuja immediately proceeds to explain how the three gunas produce the three grades of karma, signaling that this non-binding action is the gateway to bhakti-yoga fruition.
divergence: Ramanuja: 'paramapu-rusa-kartrtva-anusandhanena yasya bhavah... ahankrto na... bud-dhir na lipyate... na nibadhydate tat-phalam na anubhavati' — agency is transferred to the Lord, fruit disowned.
- Madhvadvaita
Madhva's comment is lapidary: the verse praises the knowledge just described — whoever retains even a trace of ahankara (the sense 'I act independently of Hari') is to that degree bound, and whoever wholly surrenders agency to Hari is wholly free. The jiva is eternally distinct (nitya-bhinna) from Brahman, so 'not-killing' means not acting on one's own authority, not that agency dissolves into a non-dual void. Freedom from bondage is complete subordination (paradhina-bhava) to Hari's will, not self-effacement of the jiva.
divergence: Madhva: 'yas tv isad-badhydate sa isad-ahankari ca' — even a trace of independent self-assertion produces a corresponding trace of bondage; the verse is a precise, graduated claim, not a mystical paradox.
- Vallabhaśuddhādvaita
He who meditates on the Paramatman (paradevata) as the primary agent (mukhya-kartrtva-anusandhana) in body and senses — so that no egoic agitation (ahankrta mano-vikara) arises in himself, and whose intellect is not smeared by attachment to fruit — even slaying these worlds is not slaying them, nor is he bound by that action. Vallabha adds the cross-reference to BG 5.10 ('brahmany adhaya karmani') to signal that genuine Pushti-marga action is an offering to the 'nirdosa-purna-vigraha' Krishna; it is Krishna's own lila-prasada returning through the devotee's limbs, so bondage is structurally impossible.
divergence: Vallabha: 'adhisthanadi paramhatmani mukhya-kartrkta-anusandhanato ahankrto bhavah... na bhavati... na nibadhydate tat-phalam na anubhavati... saksat-kartari paradevataym nirdosa-purna-vrigahe brahmany anusandhaya.'
- Śrīdharabhakti
In response to the implied question 'who then is the one of right understanding (su-mati) free from karma-lepa?', Sridhara answers: one in whom neither the sense 'I am the doer' (aham karta) nor the ego's insistence on authorship (ahankara-bhava kartrtva-abhinivesa) arises, because he perceives the body and senses alone as acting; whose intellect does not cling to pleasant or unpleasant outcomes (istanista-buddhi-sa-jjata); who, seeing himself as distinct from body and the like (dehadivyati-riktatma-darsi), does not in his own sight (sva-drsti) perform the killing even as the world's sight sees bodies fall. Sridhara closes with BG 5.10 as scriptural confirmation and adds a rhetorical clincher: if even karma done as a means to purification does not bind this person, how much less direct liberative action?
divergence: Sridhara: 'dehadivyatiriktatma-darsi... sva-drshstya na hanti... na ca tat-phlair nibadhydate... brahmanyadhaya karmani sangam tyaktva karoti yah / lipyate na sa papena.'
- Madhusūdanaadvaita-bhakti
*Yasya nāhaṅkṛto bhāvaḥ* — whose *bhāva* (inner sense) takes no form of 'I acted': not because ego is suppressed, but because *avidyā sakāryā bādhitā* — *ajñāne sakārye bādhite*, ignorance together with its entire causal chain has been cancelled by *akartṛbhoktṛsva-prakāśa-paramānanda-advitīya-brahmātma-sākṣātkāra*, the direct realization, born of *śāstrācāryopadeśa-nyāya*, of the self-luminous, non-dual *brahman* that is pure non-agent and non-enjoyer. Of such a one, *buddhi na lipyate* — the *antaḥkaraṇa* does not become *anuśayinī*, does not carry the residue: *idam aham akārṣam etat phalaṁ bhokṣya* iti, the trace born of *kartṛtva-vāsanā*. That residue takes two forms — *puṇye karmaṇi harṣarūpaḥ pāpe paścāttāparūpaḥ* — elation at good action, remorse at bad. The *jñānin*'s *buddhi* is joined to neither, because *kartṛtvābhimāna* has been *bādhita*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is cited directly: *etam u haivaiṣa ete na taranti — ataḥ pāpam akaravam ataḥ kalyāṇam akaravam iti — ubhe u haivaiṣa ete tarati, nainaṁ kṛtākṛte tapataḥ* — he crosses beyond both, neither 'I sinned' nor 'I did well' touches him; *na lipyate karmaṇā pāpakena*, and *pāpakena* is *puṇyasyāpy upalakṣaṇam*, marking the good as well. *Hatvā'pi* — even having struck down *imāṁl lokān sarvān prāṇinaḥ* — *na hanti*, he is not the agent of the killing-action: *hanankriyāyāḥ kartā na bhavaty akartṛsvarūpa-sākṣātkārāt*; *na nibadhyate*, nor is he bound by *adharma-phala*, the fruit of *tatkārya*. No contradiction stands: *hatvā'pi* grants the *laukikī kartṛtvadṛṣṭi*, the conventional acknowledgment that striking occurs; *na hanti* is the negation of *kartṛtva* from the *śāstrīyā paramārthadṛṣṭi*, the ultimate standpoint. So the verse closes the *turīya caraṇa* of BG 18.12 — *na tu saṁnyāsināṁ kvacit* — declaring that *jñāna-phalabhūta vidvat-saṁnyāsa*, renunciation born as the fruit of realized knowledge, leaves no *karmalopa* whatsoever: *avidyākalpitatānām adhiṣṭhānādy-anātmakṛtānāṁ sarveṣāṁ* actions belong to the superimposed non-self, never to the *sākṣī*, the witness, who is *asaṅgo hy ayaṁ puruṣaḥ*, *kūṭasthanityaḥ*, *sarvavikāraśūnyaḥ*.
divergence: Madhusūdana: *ahankṛtabhāvaḥ na bhavati... buddhi na lipyate... na hanti hanakriyāyāḥ kartā na bhavaty akartṛsvarūpasākṣātkārāt... na nibadhyate nāpi tatkāryeṇa adharmapalena sambhidhyate* — the *laukikī* versus *paramārthadṛṣṭi* distinction resolves the apparent paradox of 'kills yet does not kill' without collapsing into contradiction. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* citation (*nainaṁ kṛtākṛte tapataḥ*) grounds the claim that neither *puṇya*-elation nor *pāpa*-remorse touches the *tattvavid*. *Pāpakena* is read as *puṇyasyāpy upalakṣaṇam*, so the immunity is total.